Sattunud korduvalt postituste ja artiklite otsa, mis näevad praeguse finantskriisi taga eelkõige tuletisinstrumente (derivatives), ei saa ma jätta viitamata nendele postitustele, mis lahkavad nende olemust. Derivative Dribble nimelisest blogist pärineb kaks postitust.

Esimene käsitleb tuletisinstrumentide olemust, mis pole iseenesest midagi muud kui leping, mille väärtus tuleneb millestki muust, milleks võib olla peaaegu kõik, mis objektiivselt mõõdetav ja mille hind muutub:

A derivative is a contract that derives its value by reference to “something else.” That something else can be pretty much anything that can be objectively observed and measured. For example, two parties, A and B, could get together and agree to take positions on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). That’s an index that can be objectively observed and measured. A could agree to pay B the total percentage-wise return on that index from October 31, 2007 to October 31, 2008 multiplied by a notional amount, where that amount is to be paid on October 31, 2008. In exchange, B could agree to make quarterly payments of some percentage of the notional amount (the swap fee) over that same time frame.

Postitus on illustreeritud joonistega ja sisaldab detailseid näiteid sellest, kuidas tuletisinstrumendid toimivad, miks neid kasutatakse ja millest nende kasulikus seisneb. Loomulikult tuleb juttu ka riskidest ja sellest, kuidas tuletisinstrumendid võimaldavad riske maandada. 

Tuletisinstrumentide hulka kuuluvad muu hulgas ka optsioonid, futuurid, forwardid ja swapid. Kuna viimaste kuude sündmuste taustal on just swapid (credit default swaps) saanud kõige negatiivsema tähelepanu osaliseks, siis teine postitus millele viitan käsitleb just CDS’ide olemust ja proovib demüstifitseerida, seda ajakirjanduse peksukotiks saanud tuletisinstrumenti muu hulgas juhtides tähelepanu sellele, et tegu ei ole kindlustusega, ega ainult spekuleerimise vahendiga, mis on võrdsustatav hasartmänguga:

In the case of the roulette wheel, we have money committed to the occurrence of an event that cannot be controlled or predicted by the person making the commitment. Moreover, this “investment” is made for no bona fide economic purpose with an expected negative return on investment. In the case of B buying protection through a CDS on a bond he did not own, we have money committed to the occurrence of an event that cannot be controlled by B but can be reasonably predicted by B, and through collective action we have the serendipitous effect of sharing information. To call the latter gambling is to call all of investing gambling. For there is no difference between the latter and buying stock, buying bonds, investing in the college education of your children, etc.

Ja lõpetuseks paneb Felix Salmon tuletisinstrumendid perspektiivi läbi paari ilmunud artikli kriitika, juhtides tähelepanu mõnedele probleemsematele tõlgendustele (näiteks tuletisinstrumendid = CDS) ja tõsiasjale, et ilma tuletisinstrumentideta oleks praegune olukord veelgi hullem:

The problem isn’t CDS specifically or even derivatives in general: the problem is that the world had an enormous amount of leverage, and all that leverage is now being unwound at once. Do CDS make it easier to firms to lever up? Yes — but if CDS hadn’t been around, some other instrument would have been found which had the same effect. Blaming CDS for the market meltdown is like blaming Microsoft Word for a magazine article you don’t like: it might have made things easier, but it was hardly necessary.

Credit existed as an asset class long before CDS came along. That’s one of the reasons that the Treasury and rates markets are so liquid: anybody wanting to make a pure credit play would take a position in corporate bonds, say, and then hedge their interest-rate exposure. But corporate bonds can be illiquid, and hard to find or short, so the arrival of the CDS market made it much easier to trade credit. That’s a good thing — as I’ve said before, if it weren’t for the CDS market, none of the the credit world would be functioning right now, and we’d be in an even worse situation.

Seda veidramad on üleskutsed tuletisinstrumente täiendavalt reguleerida ilma igasuguse arusaamata sellest, millised oleks taolise reguleerimise tagajärjed. Headest kavatsustest üksinda otsuste tegemisel, mis mõjutavad paljusid ei piisa.

Muide, natuke tehnilisema ülevaate tuletisinstrumentidest ja riskide maandamisest saab eesti keeles Andres Juhkami riskijuhtimise ja tuletisinstrumentide loengukonspektist (DOC). Eriti hea on suht alguses ära toodud 6 finantsinstrumentide müüti:

Müüt 1: Tuletisinstrumendid on uued ja ülikeerulised instrumendid, mis on loodud Wall Street`i matemaatikute poolt ja millest vaid viimased aru saavad 

Müüt 2: Tuletisinstrumendid on vaid spekulatiivsed instrumendid, mis pakuvad suurt finantsvõimendust

Müüt 3: Derivatiivide ohustavad finantssüsteemi stabiilsust  

Müüt 4: Finantstuletisinstrumendid on vaid riskijuhtimise hetkeline moenarrus  

Müüt 5: Ainult riske eelistav (Risk-Seeking) organisatsioon peaks kasutama tuletisinstrumente 

Müüt 6: Finantstuletisinstrumentidega seonduvad riskid on uued ja tundmatud