VoxEU – 5 huvitavat artiklit
Mõned huvitavamad artiklid, mis on viimasel ajal voxeu.org’is ilmunud ja tundusid piisavalt huvitavad, et läbi lugeda ja ka teistega jagada:
The failure of the Lisbon strategy – Charles Wyplosz, kelle õpikutest on vist enamus kohalike ärijuhte tarkust ammutanud, kirjutab kriitiliselt Lissaboni strateegiast ja hoiatab bürokraatiakolli toitmise eest:
One could argue that the Lisbon strategy may not be that helpful but, at least, that it does no harm. Even that is too kind an interpretation. First, the process has led to the build up of a new bureaucracy, both within each country’s administration and within the Commission. If the strategy is useless, this is a clear waste of resources. More worrisome is that putting the strategy at the heart of EU cooperation may have distracted leaders from concentrating on narrower and more specific common efforts. The overall unreachable objective, backed by tens of detailed commitments painfully listed in the annual reports, has a Soviet-style flavour to it.
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The economics of open-air markets – John List, kirjutab vabaõhu turgudest, millega enamus meist märksa rohkem kokku puutub ja uuris kartellide teket taolistel turgudele:
These contrasting insights from nearly identical experimental situations highlight a general lesson for policymakers; transference of results across situations (or time, or different industries) is dangerous. Theory teaches us that the determinants of cartel success are rich, and the empirical data herein highlight that sellers are quite sensitive to these factors, even ones that many might consider ancillary. In this spirit, one prominent aspect of the data is that one should take great care when generalising results.
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Government outsourcing: Public contracting with private monopol – Emmanuelle Auriol ja Pierre M. Picard, kirjutavad avalike teenuste (vesi, elekter, post jne) sisseostmisest ja seeläbi erasektori organisatsioonidele monopoliõiguste andmisest ja selle majanduslikust loogikast:
Comparing aggregate welfare in regulation and outsourcing scenarios, we show that the set of economic parameters supporting the outsourcing decision is far from negligible. Moreover, we find that outsourcing is more desirable for activities with stronger technological uncertainty or lower profitability and for governments with tougher financial constraints. This provides a useful grid for policy analysis of outsourcing decisions and public-private partnerships in practice.
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Financial market systemic regulation: Stability through democratic diversity – Nicholas Dorn, kirjutab kui oluline on regulatiivsete raamistike erinevus riigiti ja soovib seda saavutada läbi vähem tehnokraatlike lähenemiste, kus demokraatlikult valitud esindajatel on sõnaõigus suurem:
To reverse the trend of ever-increasing regulatory convergence, regulatory diversity needs democratic steering of regulatory agencies. This would overtly politicise financial market regulation, diluting if not displacing the currently dominant idea of regulation as a purely “technical” matter.
There would be strong functional advantages. Strong accountability of regulators to parliaments offers the prospect of diversity in regional and national regulatory regimes, since political constituencies may differ and change over time in their understandings of the issues and in their policy preferences. Democratically-fuelled regulatory diversity is a safeguard against the recently experienced frenzy in global financial regulation and markets.
Kahju ainult, et ta avaliku valiku probleeme taolises konttekstis ei mainita, sest see sunniks taolisesse lähenemisesse märksa skeptilisemalt suhtuma.
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Corporate taxes and union wages – Alison Felix ja James R. Hines Jr. kirjutavad ettevõtte tulumaksu tõstmise mõjust ametiühingutesse kuuluvate töötajate palkadele, millest järeldub, et tugeva ametiühinguga ettevõtete kõrgem kasumi maksustamine tähendab madalamaid palkasid töötajatele:
The evidence that US union wage premiums decline at higher rates of taxation serves as a reminder that stakeholders of all kinds – workers, suppliers, customers, executives, and certainly owners – share in the rents produced by profitable firms. Efforts to tax firms more heavily create burdens that will be distributed among stakeholders, possibly including many groups that governments otherwise attempt to help.
Toomas ja Marit Hinnosaar kirjutasid ühest voxeu.org artiklist aga eraldi postituse: Kas rektor peaks olema teadlane või juht?
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