Island, Island see võrratu Island (täiendatud)
TÄIENDATUD: Selgub, et islandlased pole päris nõus sellega, et nende pankade varadega inglased sedavõrd nahhaalselt ümber käisid. Icelanders are NOT terrorists kampaania kogub hoogu veebis, kus lisaks piltidele võib leida ka viiteid erinevate väljaannete kajastusele. Üks viidetest juhatab Islandi majandusteadlase mõtlemapanevale kirjale, mis saadetud Financial Times’ile:
These loans correspond to a little less than one half of the support that Hungary is receiving to deal with its financial crisis. Hungary has a population of 10m; Iceland, 320,000. The government of Iceland has now been offered foreign loans that roughly equal the country’s gross domestic product. The annual interest payments, say 3-4 per cent, approximately correspond to the country’s annual economic growth. Additionally, the loans must be paid up.
The burden is unrealistic. The most likely consequences are: extremely high inflation, economic decline, mass emigration and political disorder. I am reminded of the situation facing Germany in 1919 following the Versailles Peace Treaty, which John Maynard Keynes famously analysed in Economic Consequences of the Peace.
Arnold Kling küsis selle peale küsimuse, millele oleks tõesti huvitav vastust teada:
If Iceland is bankrupt, is it for sale? Could one of us buy it? Charge rent for people to live there, and try to turn around the place so that it operates at a profit?
…
Vaatamata dramaatilistele sündmustele Islandi finantssektoris ja majanduses pole Vabalogis peale ühte aprilli postitust Islandist erilist põhjust kirjutada, eriti kui kõik seda nagunii teevad. Samas oli juba siis selge, et midagi on mäda selles väikeriigi finantssüsteemis, kui poliitikud erastasid sisuliselt terve pangandussüsteemi enda kitsastest huvidest lähtudes kui mitte päris endale siis vähemalt sõpradele.
Nüüd on siis selgunud, et aasta alguses külastas Islandi ühe kohaliku panga kutsel kaks majandusteadlast (Willem Buiter (kelle ettepanekust pole veel eestlased kinni hakanud, miks?!) ja Anne Sibert), et anda selgitav ülevaade finantssektori probleemidest ja pakkuda välja võimalike lahendusi. Tulemuseks oli uurimus, mille avaldamist pidasid kohalikud liiga ohtlikuks:
In April and July 2008, our Icelandic interlocutors considered our paper to be too market-sensitive to be put in the public domain and we agreed to keep it confidential. Because the worst possible outcome has now materialised, both for the banks and for Iceland, there is no reason not to circulate the paper more widely, as some of its lessons have wider relevance.
Buiteri ja Siberti uurimus on nüüd kõigile saadaval (PDF) ja huvitunutel on võimalik tutvuda ka VoxEU’s ilmunud kokkuvõttega, kust pärineb ka eelnev tsitaat. Huvitavat leiab sealt muudki nagu ka äärmiselt teravat kriitikat Ühendkuningriikide valitsuse suunal süüdistades neid sisuliselt valetamises:
In addition, outrageous bullying behaviour by the UK authorities (who invoked the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, passed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, to justify the freezing of the UK assets of the of Landsbanki and Kaupthing) probably precipitated the collapse of Kaupthing – the last Icelandic bank still standing at the time. The official excuse of the British government for its thuggish behaviour was that the Icelandic authorities had informed it that they would not honour Iceland’s deposit guarantees for the UK subsidiaries of its banks. Transcripts of the key conversation on the issue between British and Icelandic authorities suggest that, if the story of Pinocchio is anything to go by, a lot of people in HM Treasury today have noses that are rather longer than they used to be.
Loomulikult ei piirdunud poliitiline soperdamine brittidega vaid arvestatava panuse andis ka keskpanga ebakompetentne soperdamine, paljuski tänu poliitiku määramise kohale, mida oleks pidanud täitma hoopis pangandusega natukenegi paremini kursis olnud inimene. Kirjutab Richard Portes Financial Times’is:
When foreign short-run credit lines closed, Glitnir had to request a short-term loan from the Central Bank of Iceland, which refused. Rather than taking Glitnir into administration, the CBI enforced nationalisation on punitive terms. The governor, David Oddsson, was prime minister for 13 years prior to moving to the CBI in 2005. His decision reflected politics, technical incompetence and ignorance of markets, and his comments thereafter were highly destabilising.
. . .
The CBI then made two further egregious errors. The central bank had mishandled its interest rate policy and the foreign exchange markets since early 2008. On Monday, it announced a currency peg at a rate well above the market. Without effective controls, this was unsustainable, and was abandoned by Tuesday.
. . .
Politicians should not become central bank governors. Mr Oddsson is part of the problem, not of any solution, and should resign immediately. Allowing partial “euroisation” was a recipe for instability. And Iceland was unable or unwilling to arrange early international support, nor did it wish to call in the International Monetary Fund.
Kõik see juttu finantspoliitikast kisub ehk liiga kaugeks tavaislandlase elust, kuid seda puudust aitab kõrvaldada Jonathan Last’i pikem kirjutis Islandist, mis ilmub peatselt ka Weekly Standardis. Artikli alguses on küll kohustuslik tagatausta selgitus, kuid jutt läheb üpris kiiresti reaalsetele tagajärgedele, mis ulatuvad valuutaoksjonitest ja kaubanduse krediididiprobleemidest massiliselt lahkuvate poolakateni (ehitajad, mõistagi), kellel pole kohaliku rahaga enam midagi teha. Mõistagi on inimloovus ka sellele probleemile huvitava lahenduse leida:
Since January the krona has declined 64 percent against the euro, so he’s raised vehicle prices by 25 to 30 percent. In 2007, Hekla sold 9,000 vehicles, used and new. As of August, sales were off 68 percent year-on-year. But even that doesn’t give an accurate picture of present reality. Asked how many vehicles he’s sold recently, Hauksson laughs. “We sold six new cars last week–which was 30 percent of sales in all of Iceland. This week will probably be zero.” Hauksson is trying to ship as much of his stock as possible back to Europe.
In an odd twist, there has emerged a small market for used cars. Polish immigrants leaving Iceland are buying them. Since they can’t convert their savings out of kronas and kronas are worthless outside of Iceland, they’re converting their money into cars–four-wheeled investment vehicles, if you will–and shipping them home.
Keda huvitab ülevaade elust Islandil täna ilma hüsteerikata, tagasihoidliku positiivses võtmes, siis Iceland Melts Down väärib mõnda lugemise minutit.
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