VABALOG

Devalveerimise ja deflatsiooni argumentidest Läti näitel

Viimase kuu jooksul on devalveerimise teema piisavalt aktuaalseks muutunud, et isegi kohalike ajalehtede esikaanel jõuda – vägitegu, mis vaid mõned kuud tagasi poleks just eriti mõeldav olnud. Iseenesest hea, et asja arutatakse. Kindlasti ei tule plusside ja miinuste kaalumine kahjuks. Kõigil on võimalus mõelda sellele, kuidas devalveerimine mõjutaks nende sissetulekut ja kohustuste teenindamise võimalust. Ma julgeks positiivseks pidada ka seda, et kõigile hakkab kohale jõudma tõsiasi, et samas vaimus elu Euroopa piirialadel kohe kindlasti jätkuda ei saa.

Valida on deflatsiooni ja devalveerimise vahel. Mõlemal on omad head ja vead, kuid mulle tundub, et olukorras, kus lätlased on IMF’i abiga minemas deflatsiooni teed ei pruugi isegi meie tahtest devalveerida piisada ja oleme samuti sunnitud tallama deflatsiooni vaevarikast rada. Hindadel – eriti palkadel – on kalduvus aga väga vaevarikkalt muutuda kui muutumise suunaks on langemine, mis võib aga viia ebameeldivalt pika (kuni 2012?) ja masendava kohanemisperioodini, kus edukaks saab pidada iga aastat, kus majandus täiendavalt kokku ei tõmbu. 

Kui devalveerimise argumentidest on Edward Hugh erinevate postituste näol juba juttu olnud, siis vastuargumentidest ja deflatsioonist märksa vähem. Selle vea on aga parandanud IMF’i Ida-Euroopa regionaalne esindaja Christophe Rosenberg (kes pidas ka läbirääkimisi lätlastega) RGE Monitori postituses Why the IMF Supports the Latvian Currency Peg, kus ta toob välja üheksa põhjust sellest, miks IMF ei nõudnud lati devalveerimist. Üks huvitavamaid on kolmas punkt:

This is why, thirdly, Latvia’s preference for the peg is strongly supported by all foreign stakeholders, including the EU and its Nordic neighbors. They have put their money where their mouth is, providing three quarters of the total financial package of EUR 7.5 billion that backs the peg. In a remarkable show of solidarity, three new EU member states—the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia—also contributed. The Swedish, Danish and Norwegian banks operating in Latvia are doing their part by publicly committing to support the liquidity and capital needs of their Baltic subsidiaries. Given the long-term bricks and mortar investments made in the region, it seems unlikely that they will cut their losses and pull out, as Japanese banks did during the Asian crisis.

RGE Monitor’i Ida-Euroopa peaanalüütik Mary Stokes on samuti otsustanud välja astuda lati praeguse kursi ja deflatsiooni kaitseks postituses Devaluation In Latvia: Why Not?, kus peatub eelkõige devalveerimise mõjul regionaalsele finantsstabiilsusele ja ekspordi konkurentsivõimele:

As mentioned above, mass defaults will likely occur, regardless of whether Latvia chooses devaluation or internal deflation. But there may be a difference in timing.

Devaluation would lead to a wave of defaults occurring in a concentrated period. Internal deflation would also result in defaults, but they would likely be spread over a more protracted period.  In Latvia’s particular case and given the current global environment, there is reason to believe that opting for the more drawn-out internal adjustment route would result in less financial instability in Latvia and beyond.

Latvia, on its own, makes up only a small proportion of these Swedish banks’ total lending and total operating profits. However, as mentioned by a number of analysts  (including Anders Aslund and Edward Hugh), a devaluation in Latvia is likely to trigger devaluations in its key trading partners – Estonia and probably Lithuania. So a devaluation in Latvia has to be considered in light of the fact that such a devaluation will start a chain reaction through neighboring Baltics.

That is, these Swedish banks would be dealing with a mass of defaults across Estonia, Latvia, and potentially Lithuania. This would really start to have an impact on financial stability in the region and in Sweden. This could even cause these Swedish banks to rethink their presence in the Baltics and withdraw from these markets, given the mass of defaults they would be hit with all at once. The departure of these banks from the Baltics would be a massive blow to financial stability and consequently, it would impede economic recovery in the Baltics, as these Swedish banks make up the bulk of these countries’ financial systems, as can be seen below.

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Beyond financial stability, the other major consideration in examining a Latvia devaluation is competitiveness. Will a devaluation in Latvia actually boost exports given the current global slowdown?

According to Edward Hugh, ‘exports are the name of the game’ and the only possible area for growth. But it’s unclear how much a devaluation would boost them, especially considering the struggling EU buys 80% of all Latvian exports.

More specifically, the other two Baltics (Estonia and Lithuania) are Latvia’s top trading partners, accounting for about 30% of its exports in 2007, followed by Germany, which took about 9%. As all these partners are in the midst of their own sharp downturns, it’s questionable how much a devaluation in Latvia would actually boost exports, especially since such a move would likely trigger competitive devaluations in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, which are also struggling with sharp downturns and double-digit current-account deficits.

Ma viitan RGE Monitorile eelkõige sellepärast, et Nouriel Roubini on RGE Monitori raudvarana sealsed inimesed üpris skeptiliseks harjutanud, mis annab alust arvata, et tegu ei ole analüütikutega, kes riske alahindavad. 

Tõenäoliselt oleks ebaviisakas siinkohal mitte viidata Edward Hugh vastukajale, mis on pikk ja põhjalik ning sisaldab hulgaliselt mõtteainet. Üks huvitavamaid arutluskäikusid peatub aga variandil, mis võiks devalveerimise teha alla neelatavaks isegi neile, kes muidu oleks pigem sellele vastu:

On my view, the EU and the IMF need a coherent common strategy to address the whole situation in the East (at least across those countries who form part of the EU), and I think we are rapidly getting past the point where problems can be dealt with on a piecemeal basis. I mean. clearly some of the points here post date our earlier debate, but part of the foundation of my initial argument was that the whole situation was at risk of becoming so serious that nothing less than a concerted regional initiative would have the credibility and the robustness to work. It may be that outright eurosisation of the entire group maybe the only viable way to go, but I need to argue this separately and substantially, so I will not go into this further here). But, be that as it may, the leading question is that even if eurosiation is to be contemplated, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Bulgaria all need to come of their pegs and lower the parity at which they would enter, and even if the situation in each case is different, the problem is going to be the same, so my underlying point would be better to do this in a cordinated way, and indeed the decision by the Hungarian government to come off their band back in May could be seen as a first step in just this direction.

Eurole üleminek on üks peamisi põhjuseid, miks devalveerimisest ei saa Eestis krooni osas eriti tõsiselt juttu olla. ERM II ei luba devalveerimist rohkem kui 15% võrra ja sellest jääks ilmselgelt väheks. Kui aga vajalikus ulatuses devalveerimine võimaldaks kohe üle minna eurole, siis tasuks seda tõsiselt kaaluda. Jah, valus oleks see kindlasti, kuid tee tagasi majanduskasvu juurde oleks tõenäoliselt märksa lühem.

Ma olen varem väitnud, et juba jooksevkonto defitsiidi suurus annab mõista, et kohalik raha on üle hinnatud, kuid selle ülehinnatuse mõõtmiseks on ka peenemaid meetodeid. Real effective exchange rate (REER) on indeks, millega üritatakse hinnata riigi konkurentsivõimet kulude osas tema peamiste konkurentidega rahvusvahelisel turul. Eesti indeks oli 2007. aastal 135, mis annab põhjust oletada, et praeguseks oleme jõudnud vähemalt 140 tasemeni samas kui Soomes, Rootsis ja Poolas on samad näitajad 102, 100 ja 107.

Miski peab kuskilt järgi andma, küsimus on seega eelkõige selles “mis” ja “millal”?

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